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ABSTRACT 
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control* 
by Johan Lagerlöf† and Paul Heidhues‡ 
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately 
informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the 
merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust 
authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority's 
decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information 
processing/gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the 
merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. 
We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency 
defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a 
three-step procedure that take the influence activities into consideration.  
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Wann ist eine Effizienzverteidigung in der Fusionskontrolle wünschenswert? 
Eine Effizienzverteidigung in der Fusionskontrolle besagt, dass wettbewerbs-
beschränkende Fusionen dann erlaubt werden, wenn hinreichend große Synergieeffekte 
zu erwarten sind. Mögliche Synergieeffekte einer Fusion sind jedoch hauptsächlich den 
fusionierenden Unternehmen bekannt. Eine Effizienzverteidigung ermöglicht es den 
fusionierenden Unternehmen, die Entscheidung der Wettbewerbsbehörde zu 
beeinflussen, indem sie der Wettbewerbsbehörde ihre Informationen strategisch 
weitergeben (oder zurückhalten).  Die Autoren untersuchen, ob und wann eine 
Effizienzverteidigung aus gesellschaftlicher Sicht wünschenswert ist. 
 
Hierzu entwickeln sie ein Model, in dem Unternehmen, die fusionieren möchten, 
private Informationen über die Synergieeffekte der Fusion besitzen. Die Unternehmen 
können die Entscheidung der Wettbewerbsbehörde beeinflussen, indem sie ihre 
Informationen strategisch an die Wettbewerbsbehörde weiterleiten. Obwohl die 
Informationen über Synergien die Entscheidung der Wettbewerbsbehörde verbessern, 
kann die Einflussnahme der Firmen die Wohlfahrt verringern, falls die Firmen zu viel in 
das Sammeln und Verarbeiten dieser Informationen investieren. Ob dies der Fall ist, 
hängt von der Ausgestaltung der Fusionskontrolle ab und insbesondere davon, ob die 
Fusionskontrolle eine Effizienzverteidigung zulässt. In dem theoretischen Model wird 
die optimale Fusionskontrollinstitution hergeleitet und Bedingungen herausgearbeitet 
unter denen eine Effizienzverteidigung wünschenswert ist. Die Autoren erörtern die 
Implikationen des Modells für die Fusionspolitik und entwickeln ein Drei-Stufen-
Verfahren für Fusionsentscheidungen, welches die Einflussaktivitäten der Unternehmen 
berücksichtigt.  
 
 
iv 
“[A] policy of approving anticompetitive mergers for eﬃciency reasons is likely
to promote a dissipation of resources into rent seeking.” Franklin M. Fisher
(1987, p. 39)
1 Introduction
The appropriate regulation of mergers is an important policy issue in the US as
well as in Europe, and the question whether eﬃciency gains (either proven or
only claimed) should constitute a reason not to challenge an otherwise anticom-
petitive merger is much debated.1 Williamson (1968) was the first to stress that
the decision whether to permit a merger potentially involves a welfare tradeoﬀ:
whereas permitting the merger is likely to increase the merged unit’s market
power, as doing this reduces the number of rivals competing in the market, it
may also allow the newly created firm to realize eﬃciency gains. One strand
of the theoretical literature on mergers has investigated this tradeoﬀ in various
oligopoly models; see, for example, Williamson (1968), Deneckere and Davidson
(1985), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), and Spector (2001).
While these contributions can inform an antitrust authority’s decision whether
to permit a proposed merger and, for example, provide reasons to be very scep-
tical, they do not explain why an antitrust authority as a matter of principle
should rule out the possibility that an anticompetitive merger may be permitted
for eﬃciency reasons: rules and guidelines that do exactly this (like the previ-
ous ones used in the US and the current ones in the EU) cannot be justified
by the literature cited above. However, one conceivable benefit with making
an irreversible commitment not to permit mergers for eﬃciency reasons is that
this may discourage rent seeking or other forms of influence activities. This
point has indeed often been made in the literature; see, for example, the above
1Currently, the American policy allows for an explicit eﬃciency defense whereas the Euro-
pean does not. Until fairly recently, however, the US policy, as expressed by the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission,
placed much less weight on the eﬃciency criterion; for a discussion and evaluation of these
changes of the Guidelines, in particular with respect to the treatment of eﬃciencies, see for
example Farrell and Shapiro (2001) and several of the contributions in the Spring 1999 issue
of the George Mason Law Review. On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Com-
mission is currently considering to move toward taking possible eﬃciencies into account when
assessing proposed mergers; for recent discussions, see Röller, Stennek, and Verboven (2000),
Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn (2001), and European Commission (2001). One reason why the
European Commission is currently considering this step is that the increased frequency of
cross-border mergers has raised the question whether American and European rules should
be standardized.
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quotation by Fisher.2 Yet it is not clear whether all kinds of influence activ-
ities should count as a social cost of allowing for an eﬃciency defense. For if
the activities take the form of outright monetary bribes, then they merely rep-
resent a transfer of wealth between diﬀerent economic agents. Similarly, one
often-mentioned reason why allowing for an eﬃciency defense may make the
merger control procedure easier to influence is that the merging firms (hereafter
called the insiders) typically have superior access to information about any eﬃ-
ciencies;3 hence, by strategically transmitting such information to the antitrust
authority, the insiders may be able to achieve a favorable decision. The welfare
eﬀects of such influence activities could be either positive or negative, depending
on whether the cost of gathering, processing, and transmitting the information
is oﬀset by its social benefits.4
Thus, in order to better understand under what circumstances influence ac-
tivities indeed may serve as a reason not to allow for an eﬃciency defense, it
is important to model the reason why they may be influential and then, in an
equilibrium analysis, investigate the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent merger control
institutions, with and without an eﬃciency defense. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no attempt in the literature to do this. The present paper tries
to fill this gap. Although the model we develop is relatively simple, it captures
three important aspects of a merger control procedure: Williamson’s tradeoﬀ
between increased market power and possible eﬃciency gains, the insiders’ hav-
ing superior access to information about any eﬃciencies, and these firms’ vested
interest in having the merger permitted.
In particular, we model the merger control procedure as an interaction be-
tween two economic agents: the insiders (acting as one unit) and society. The
2The argument can also be found in Neven et al. (1993, p. 213, n. 41) and in Röller et al.
(2000, p. 121)
3The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (US Department of Justice and US Federal Trade
Commission, 1997, Section 4) state explicitly that “[...] much of the information relating to
eﬃciencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms.” Yao and Dahdouh (1993)
discuss the problem of informational asymmetries in merger control at length and argue that
asymmetries in the access to information are particularly important for eﬃciencies.
4An early paper that explicitly interprets rent-seeking expenditures as costs of information
gathering is Tullock (1975). Later contributions that have provided informational foundations
to the rent-seeking theory, by showing that there may be overinvestment in information ac-
qusition from a social welfare point of view, include Shavell (1994) and Lagerlöf (1997). More
generally, lobbying as a form of strategic information transmission has been modeled in, for
example, Austen-Smith and Wright (1992); for a recent survey, see Grossman and Helpman
(2001).
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eﬃciency gains due to the merger may be “low” or “high.” Whereas the insid-
ers want to merge regardless of the size of the eﬃciencies, society only wants
the merger to take place if they are high. Initially, only the insiders know
whether the eﬃciencies are high or low. This information, however, is soft (i.e.,
non-verifiable), which means that in order to be able to credibly transmit it to
society, the insiders must first invest resources in evidence production. If they
do this and if they are successful, they find hard (i.e., verifiable) information
about the size of the eﬃciency gains, which they (if this is in their interest) can
disclose to society.5 The role of society is to choose a merger control institution,
by which we mean a rule whether to permit the proposed merger conditional on
whether the insiders have submitted a report and whether this report showed
that the eﬃciencies are high or low. We assume that society commits to such
a rule at an ex ante stage. A merger control institution that “allows for an
eﬃciency defense” is understood as a rule where the fact that the insiders have
provided hard information about the size of the eﬃciencies (instead of not hav-
ing done this) aﬀects the probability that the merger is permitted.
In an equilibrium of this model, the insiders will never invest in evidence pro-
duction when having soft information that the eﬃciencies are low. When they
have soft information that the eﬃciencies are high, whether and to what extent
they invest depend on what institution society has chosen. An institution that
does not allow for an eﬃciency defense will not induce any evidence production
at all. Two examples of such institutions that are important in our analysis are
what we call the laissez-faire regime (LF) and the strict regime (SR): under LF,
a merger is always permitted while under SR it never is.6 By committing to an
institution that to some extent indeed allows for an eﬃciency defense, society
can induce a positive amount of evidence production. One such institution is
5Hence, we assume that the insiders incur costs because they must process their information
(i.e., transform it from soft to hard) before being able to communicate it. We would get almost
the same results if we instead assumed that the insiders’ costs concerned the acquisition
of information; see our discussion in the concluding section. One may argue about which
assumption is the most plausible; perhaps it is something in between those two polar cases.
In any case, what we want to capture with our assumption is the real-world phenomenon
that firms that want to merge typically, with the aim of convincing the antitrust authorities
that the merger should be permitted, hire lawyers and economists as consultants and make
extensive use of their own personnel and other resources to prepare their case.
6The important feature of these institutions is that the decision whether to permit the
merger is not made contingent on the insiders’ reports about eﬃciencies. The decision could,
however, very well be contingent on other circumstances, as long as these are publicly known.
See our discussion in Section 5.
3
the one where a merger is not permitted if society receives a report saying that
the eﬃciencies are low or if it does not receive any report at all, and the merger
is permitted with a probability γ if society receives a report saying that the
eﬃciencies are high. Here, the larger is γ the more the insiders will invest. In
the extreme, when the probability γ equals unity, we obtain the hard evidence
regime (HE): a merger is permitted if and only if society receives a report saying
that the eﬃciencies are high.
Hence, in our model, a possible cost of allowing for an eﬃciency defense
is that this encourages the insiders to spend resources in order to influence
the decision whether to allow the merger. The resource costs enter the social
welfare function and may thus, in principle, be wasted. On the other hand, the
information that the insiders report might be useful for society, in which case
there also are benefits with an eﬃciency defense. Society thus faces a tradeoﬀ. It
turns out that even though society has an opportunity to fine tune the insiders’
incentives for evidence production by choosing an institution that gives rise to
a positive amount of evidence production but still less than under HE, this is
never optimal. That is, the institution that maximizes expected social welfare is
either SR, LF, or HE. One reason for this result is that society can only choose
the insiders’ amount of evidence production indirectly, through its choice of
the merger control institution. Thus, society’s ability to choose investment
incentives is limited by the insiders’ optimal response. In addition, institutions
whose outcomes diﬀer from the outcomes of SR, LF, and HE require society
to commit to an ex post merger decision that uses the available information
suboptimally.
Finding the socially optimal institution thus amounts to comparing LF, SR,
and HE, of which only HE involves an eﬃciency defense. We show that, de-
pending on the parameters of our model, any one of these three institutions
can be optimal. By inspecting the conditions needed for a particular institution
to be the best one, we arrive at some non-trivial and sometimes rather sub-
tle conclusions about the desirability of an eﬃciency defense and the optimal
design of a merger control procedure. First, as the arguments above suggest,
an eﬃciency defense is indeed sometimes desirable. If so, however, the burden
of proof as to the existence of large eﬃciencies should be placed fully on the
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merging firms. Second, an eﬃciency defense is more likely to be optimal (from a
total surplus point of view) when “high” eﬃciencies are so high that they would
give rise to a lower market price. This is because then the insiders’ incentives to
invest are such that society should encourage evidence production as much as
it can. Third, there is an important asymmetry between situations with a low
respectively high prior probability that a merger would increase total surplus:
when the prior is relatively low, the problem of the insiders’ dissembling can
be dealt with very easily and at no real cost, whereas this is not true for the
case when the prior is relatively high. As a consequence, an eﬃciency defense
is more desirable when the merger is unlikely to be welfare enhancing.
Although this paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one to in-
vestigate the desirability of an eﬃciency defense using an equilibrium analysis,
there are some other papers that also study institutional design in the context
of merger control. Besanko and Spulber (1993) and Neven and Röller (2001),
for example, study the relative merits of a welfare standard and a consumer
standard. Similarly, Lewis and Poitevin (1997) investigate the desirability of
mandatory disclosure rules in regulatory proceedings. Laﬀont and Tirole (1993,
ch. 15) develop a model of regulatory capture and institutional design, although
not in the context of merger control. Our paper is also related to a literature that
models evidence production in trials or regulatory proceedings; see, for exam-
ple, Sanchirico (2001) and Legros and Newman (1999). Their way of modeling
evidence production, however, is diﬀerent from ours. Similarly, information ac-
quisition and institutional design has also been studied by, for example, Aghion
and Tirole (1997) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next, in Section 2,
we present the model. In Section 3 we begin the analysis and show that the
optimal merger control institution is either LF, SR, or HE. Then, in Section 4,
we compare these three institutions and find the optimal one. In Section 5 we
discuss the implications of our results for antitrust policy. In particular we sketch
a three-step merger control procedure that takes the influence activities into
consideration. Section 6 concludes by briefly discussing some possible extensions
and variations of our model.
7Other related papers include Corchón and Faulí-Oller (2000), Daughety and Reinganum
(2000), Froeb and Kobayashi (2001), and Shin (1998).
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2 A Model of Merger Control and Influence Ac-
tivities
Consider the following simple model of a merger control process. There are two
economic agents: on the one hand society and on the other two firms that have
proposed to merge (acting as one unit). The two firms, which are hereafter
called the insiders, should be thought of as producing and selling a good on
an oligopolistic market, although the market interaction will not be explicitly
modeled here. The other firms on that market (the outsiders), as well as the
consumers, are passive in that they do not attempt to influence the merger
control process.8
The eﬃciency of the new firm that is created if the merger takes place,
denoted e, is either “low” (e = eL) or “high” (e = eH). Initially, e is private
information to the insiders: society’ places the prior probability p on the event
that the post-merger eﬃciency is high, where p ∈ (0, 1). Although the insiders
do know the true post-merger eﬃciency already from the outset, the information
they have is assumed to be soft (i.e., non-verifiable). This means that, given the
preferences that we will specify shortly, the insiders will not be able to credibly
transmit their information to society–for that they will first have to invest
resources in evidence production (more on this later).
We assume that regardless of whether the post-merger eﬃciency is low or
high, it is profitable for the insiders to merge; that is,
πH > πL > πN , (1)
where πH (respectively, πL) is the insiders’ profit if the merger is permitted and
the post-merger eﬃciency turns out to be high (respectively, low), and πN is the
insiders’ (joint) profit if the merger is banned. Moreover, permitting the merger
increases social welfare if and only if the post-merger eﬃciency turns out to be
high; that is,
WH > WN > WL, (2)
where WH (respectively, WL) is the unweighted sum of consumer surplus and
industry profits if the merger is permitted and the post-merger eﬃciency turns
8 In the concluding section we briefly discuss how our analysis would be aﬀected if also the
outsiders or a consumer group were taking part in the influence activities.
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out to be high (respectively, low), and WN is the unweighted sum of consumer
surplus and industry profits if the merger is banned.
Let us for notational ease write∆πi ≡ πi−πN and ∆Wi ≡Wi−WN (for i =
L,H). In terms of this notation, (1) and (2) amount to saying that ∆πH, ∆πL,
and ∆WH are all positive, whereas ∆WL is negative. Borrowing terminology
from Farrell and Shapiro (1990), we will refer to the case where ∆WH < ∆πH
as a situation with negative externalities, and the case where ∆WH > ∆πH as a
situation with positive externalities. All our analysis will cover both these cases.
Yet, the distinction between positive and negative externalities will be helpful
in understanding the results to be derived.
Although our proofs do not rely on it, we use the following assumption to
interpret our results:
∆WH > ∆πH ⇔ ∆CSH > 0,
where ∆CSH is the gain in consumer surplus if the merger is permitted instead
of banned, given that the post-merger eﬃciency is high. That is, the assumption
states that if there are positive externalities, then also the consumers (not only
society at large) gain from a high-eﬃciency merger. Notice that as long as
consumer surplus is only aﬀected by the merger through its eﬀect on market
price and as long as consumer surplus is decreasing in market price, a statement
that ∆CSH is positive is tantamount to saying that “high” eﬃciencies are so
high that they induce a lower post-merger than pre-merger market price.
Figure 1 shows how, for diﬀerent values of the eﬃciency parameter e, the
gains and losses that accrue to the various parties if a merger takes place typ-
ically relate to each other.9 The figure is derived from a homogenous-good
Cournot model with at least three symmetric firms prior to the merger, where
demand and cost functions are linear, and where the eﬃciency parameter e is
subtracted from the marginal cost of the insiders. Although this is only a very
simple example, we expect the qualitative features of the figure to hold true
for a much larger family of oligopoly models.10 From the figure we see that the
9Figure 1 is inspired by a similar figure in Neven and Röller (2000).
10For example, we have verified that all the qualitative features of Figure 1 also can be
derived from a diﬀerentiated-goods Bertrand model with three symmetric firms prior to the
merger, linear demand and cost functions, and the eﬃciency parameter e being subtracted
from the marginal cost of the insiders. The only thing that changes in such a setting is that
the insiders gain from the merger even if e = 0 (which is a well-known result).
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insiders would make a loss themselves by merging if e did not exceed a threshold
e◦. Moreover, for the eﬀect on welfare to be positive, e must exceed a threshold
e
0
, where e
0
> e◦. Thus, in terms of these threshold values of e, (1) and (2)
amount to assuming that eL ∈
³
e◦, e
0
´
and eH > e
0
. We also see from the
figure that the outsiders’ gain in profits and the change in consumer surplus
always have opposite signs, and these signs change at a threshold e
00
, where
e
00
> e
0
; this is the level of e above which market price becomes lower thanks
to the merger. At the same threshold level of e, society’s gain from having the
merger starts to exceed the insiders’ gain. Thus, there are negative externalities
if eH ∈
³
e
0
, e00
´
, whereas there are positive externalities if eH > e
00
.
The timing of events is as follows. (i) Society commits to a merger control
institution, z = (zL, zH , zN) ∈ [0, 1]3. We will shortly explain exactly what it
means to choose a particular z. (ii) The insiders observe z and then “invest
in evidence production”; that is, conditional on knowing that the true state
is i ∈ {L,H}, they choose a probability τ i ∈ [0, 1], thereby incurring a cost
C (τ i). By picking a particular τ i, the insiders will with that probability find
hard (i.e., verifiable) information that the post-merger eﬃciency is ei; with the
complementary probability, 1−τ i, the insiders do not find any hard information.
(iii) If having found hard information, the insiders choose whether to “submit a
report,” that is, whether to disclose this information to society. If they do this,
society also learns the true state (since the information is verifiable). (iv) Society
decides whether to permit or ban the merger, following the previously chosen
rule z = (zL, zH , zN). The component zL (respectively, zH) of this vector is a
probability with which society permits the merger if the insiders have submitted
a report saying that the post-merger eﬃciency is low (respectively, high), and
zN is a probability with which society permits the merger if the insiders have
not submitted a report.
Hence, stage (iv) is simply an implementation of the rule that society has
committed to at stage (i).11 Notice that the set of instruments that society has
11There may of course be a credibility problem associated with choosing some particular z,
perhaps especially for “mixed” z’s. One way to implement the desired z-institution in practice
may be to delegate the job to an antitrust oﬃcial who has the right private preferences; cf. the
literature on strategic delegation (to an independent central banker, for example). A mixed
z-institution could also correspond to a set of guidelines that to some extent are to open to
interpretation and which therefore make it diﬃcult to predict perfectly the decision whether
to challenge the merger. Yet another reason why we are not too worried about the credibility
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access to when it chooses an institution does not include monetary transfers
between society and the insiders.12 Otherwise, however, society has a great
deal of freedom in its choice of an institution. For at the stage where society
implements the rule z it will either know the true state (L or H) or it will
not have received a report (N), and we assume that society can commit to any
probability of allowing the merger conditional on any one these three events.
In terms of these merger control institutions, what does it mean to say that
society “allows for an eﬃciency defense”? We interpret this as a situation where
a report submitted by the insiders aﬀects the probability with which the merger
is permitted. That is, we say that society allows for an eﬃciency defense if
either zL 6= zN or zH 6= zN . Within the set of merger control institutions
that society can choose among there are three ones that will be of particular
interest to us. The first is the institution where a merger is always permitted,
z = (1, 1, 1); we call this the laissez-faire regime (LF). The second one is the
institution where a merger is never permitted, z = (0, 0, 0), which we call the
strict regime (SR). The third institution of special interest is the one where a
merger is permitted if and only if society receives a report from the insiders
showing that the post-merger eﬃciency will be high, z = (0, 1, 0); we dub this
the hard evidence regime (HE). Clearly, neither LF nor SR involves an eﬃciency
defense, whereas HE does.
As for the cost function for evidence production, C, we assume that this is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and convex (C
0
> 0, C
00
> 0), with
C (0) = 0, C
0
(0) = 0, and C
0
(1) > ∆πH . Also, the cost elasticity is weakly
increasing: η0 (τ i) ≥ 0 for all τ i ∈ [0, 1], where η (τ i) ≡ C
0
(τ i) τ i/C (τ i).13
The cost of evidence production incurred by the insiders enters with full
weight in society’s payoﬀ. Hence, given an outcome j (for j = L,H,N) of the
merger control procedure and given that the insiders have soft information that
e = ei (for i = L,H), the insiders’ payoﬀ is πj − C (τ i) and society’s payoﬀ is
Wj −C (τ i). We also assume that the insiders as well as society are risk neutral
problem is that, as we will see later, it will never be optimal for society to choose the mixed
z’s anyway.
12We find this assumption reasonable in the context of merger control. For a paper that does
allow for such transfers and which models the merger control procedure as an implementation
problem, see Corchón and Faulí-Oller (2000).
13For some results in the end of the paper we will need the stronger assumption that the
cost elasticity is constant. We will make this clear when we get there.
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and thus maximize their expected payoﬀs given the information they have access
to at the time of their decisions. Society’s expected payoﬀ (“expected welfare”)
is also the welfare standard that we employ for our normative theory.14
3 Influence Activities and Institutional Choice
We will solve the model using backward induction. Since the last stage is just
a mechanical implementation of the rule society chooses at stage (i), we are
left with three stages where actual decisions are made: the choice-of-institution
stage (i), the evidence-production stage (ii), and the reporting stage (iii).
Recall that the insiders want the merger to be permitted regardless of whether
the post-merger eﬃciency is low or high. Hence, at stage (iii), given that they
have found hard information that e = ei the insiders will submit a report for
sure if zi > zN ; if zi = zN they are indiﬀerent between submitting and not
submitting; and if zi < zN they will not submit. Similarly, at stage (ii), given
that they have soft information that e = ei, the insiders will invest in evidence
production (i.e., choose a τ i > 0) if and only if zi > zN . Clearly, however,
society will never choose zL > zN . For if society knows that the post-merger ef-
ficiency is low, it is in its interest to ban the merger. (Moreover, setting zL > zN
would encourage costly evidence production under circumstances where this is
not valuable for society.) As a result, if the institution z is optimally chosen,
the insiders will set τL = 0.
When having soft information that e = eH , the insiders face the following
problem:
max
τH∈[0,1]
[τHzH + (1− τH) zN ]πH + [τH (1− zH) + (1− τH) (1− zN)]πN −C (τH) ,
the solution of which, τ∗H , equals zero if zH ≤ zN and is implicitly defined by
∆πH (zH − zN) = C
0
(τ∗H) (3)
otherwise. The left-hand side of this first-order condition is the insiders’ marginal
benefit from evidence production when knowing that e = eH . The first factor
of the marginal benefit, ∆πH , is the insiders’ gain in profits from having the
14 In the concluding section we will discuss the implications for our results of using a con-
sumer standard instead.
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merger permitted instead of banned given that e = eH . The second factor,
(zH − zN), is the amount with which the probability of having the merger per-
mitted increases if the insiders provide hard information that the post-merger
eﬃciency indeed is high. The magnitude of this latter factor is determined by
society’s choice of institution. In particular, (zH − zN) will take its largest pos-
sible value under the institution HE, since then zH = 1 and zN = 0. Hence,
the insiders’ incentives for evidence production when knowing that e = eH will
be the strongest possible under HE.15 Similarly, under LF and SR, the insiders
will have no incentives at all to invest in evidence production (τ∗H = 0), since
then zH = zN .
What is society’s optimal choice of institution at stage (i)? To answer this
question, let us first formulate expressions for expected welfare at stage (i) under
LF, SR, and HE, which we denote by EWLF , EWSR, and EWHE, respectively.
Since under LF and SR the insiders will not invest in evidence production, we
almost trivially have EWLF = pWH+(1− p)WL and EWSR =WN . Denoting
the insiders’ choice of τH under HE by τHEH , we can write
EWHE = pτHEH WH + (1− pτHEH )WN − pC
¡
τHEH
¢
= pτHEH ∆WH +EWSR − pC
¡
τHEH
¢
. (4)
This equation highlights a basic tradeoﬀ in society’s choice of institution. By
choosing an institution that encourages evidence production, like HE, instead of
one that does not, like SR, society will sometimes be able to avoid the mistake
of banning a welfare enhancing merger; this benefit with HE is captured by the
term pτHEH ∆WH in (4). Society also cares about the insiders’ expected cost of
evidence production, however, which is captured by the term pC
¡
τHEH
¢
. The
comparison of HE and SR thus amounts to a comparison of τHEH ∆WH and
C
¡
τHEH
¢
, where τHEH is implicitly defined by ∆πH = C
0 ¡τHEH ¢. Accordingly,
which institution society should choose will depend on, among other things, how
aligned society’s and the insiders’ interests are and on the properties of the cost
function C.
In order to solve society’s problem at stage (i) we will also need a more
15Notice the importance of the qualifier “when knowing that e = eH .” The institution that
provides the strongest incentives for evidence production more generally is z = (1, 1, 0), since
this would make also τ∗L as large as possible. Of course, however, choosing an institution that
induces a τ∗L > 0 will, as we noted above, never be in society’s interest.
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general expression for expected welfare that holds for any relevant institution z.
Recall that choosing zL > zN will always be suboptimal for society. Moreover,
setting zN > zH yields the same outcome as setting zN = zH (since for any zN ≥
zH the insiders will choose τ∗H = 0 and thus not be able to report when knowing
that e = eH). Hence, without excluding any (uniquely) optimal institution we
can suppose that
zL ≤ zN ≤ zH .
Under this assumption, we can write expected welfare at stage (i) as
EW = p [τ∗HzH + (1− τ∗H) zN ]WH + (1− p)zNWL
+ {p [τ∗H (1− zH) + (1− τ∗H) (1− zN)] + (1− p) (1− zN)}WN − pC (τ∗H)
= pτ∗H (zH − zN)∆WH + (1− zN)EWSR + zNEWLF − pC (τ∗H) . (5)
Now, rewriting the first-order condition that defines τ∗H [see (3)] yields
∆πH (zH − zN) = C
0
(τ∗H) =
η (τ∗H)
τ∗H
C (τ∗H)⇒ τ∗H (zH − zN) =
η (τ∗H)
∆πH
C (τ∗H) .
(6)
Substituting (6) in (5) and re-arranging, one has
EW = pC (τ∗H)
∆WH
∆πH
·
η (τ∗H)−
∆πH
∆WH
¸
+ (1− zN)EWSR + zNEWLF , (7)
which implies that, for η (τ∗H) < ∆πH∆WH , society is strictly better oﬀ by choosing
either LF or SR rather than an institution that induces investment in evidence
production (τ∗H > 0). Moreover, if z is an optimal institution and if it gives rise
to η (τ∗H) = ∆πH∆WH , then either LF or SR is (also) an optimal institution.
Next, suppose η (τ∗H) > ∆πH∆WH . We then obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. Let zL ≤ zN ≤ zH and (zH − zN) ∈ (0, 1), and suppose that
η (τ∗H) > ∆πH∆WH . Then EW < (1− zN)EW
HE + zNEW
LF .
Proof. We can write
EW = (zH − zN)
pτ∗H∆WH
η (τ∗H)
·
η (τ∗H)−
∆πH
∆WH
¸
+ (1− zN)EWSR + zNEWLF
< (1− zN)
(
pτHEH ∆WH
η
¡
τHEH
¢ ·η ¡τHEH ¢− ∆πH∆WH
¸
+EWSR
)
+ zNEW
LF
= (1− zN)
"
pτHEH ∆WH −
pτHEH ∆πH
η
¡
τHEH
¢ +EWSR#+ zNEWLF .
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Here the first equality follows from (6) and (7); the inequality follows from
τ∗H < τHEH , zH ≤ 1, and η0 ≥ 0; and the last equality is just a re-arrangement
of terms. Making use of (4) and of (6) evaluated at τ∗H = τHEH , zN = 0, and
zH = 1, we have the inequality in the lemma. ¤
The following proposition follows immediately from Lemma 1 and the pre-
ceding analysis.
Proposition 1. No institution yields a higher expected welfare than the best
one of SR, LF, and HE. Moreover, an institution where zL > zN is never
optimal, and an institution where (zH − zN) ∈ (0, 1) is never optimal if
η (τ∗H) 6= ∆πH∆WH .
In other words, when society chooses an institution at stage (i), it will opti-
mally select one that either induces no evidence production at all or one where
the insiders’ incentives for evidence production when knowing that e = eH are
as strong as possible–in that sense society’s problem always has a corner solu-
tion. What is the reason for this? One economic force that works in favor of a
corner solution is that choosing a “mixed” z-institution involves throwing away
costly but socially valuable information: by selecting such an institution society
will sometimes learn that the true post-merger eﬃciency is high, but still it
does not permit the merger with probability one. The institutions SR, LF and
HE, in contrast, do not involve such waste. For under LF and SR there is no
investment at all in evidence production. And under HE there is, but then the
information is always made use of in the sense that society permits the merger
with probability one when having learned that the eﬃciencies are high.
More generally, important for the corner-solution result is the fact that so-
ciety cannot choose τL and τH directly, only indirectly through its choice of
a z-institution. This means that society’s optimal choice of an institution will
depend on the insiders’ response. As a consequence, society’s objective function
is not necessarily a quasi-concave function of the choice variables. Moreover,
even when this objective function happens to be quasi-concave, society’s limited
set of instruments will make an institution where the insiders choose an interior
τH undesirable.
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4 The Optimal Merger Control Institution
It remains to answer the question how the three institutions LF, SR, and HE
perform in terms of expected welfare relative to each other. In doing this we
will impose a stronger assumption on the cost function C than before. Instead
of just assuming that the cost elasticity is everywhere weakly increasing, we will
from now on say that the cost elasticity is constant; that is, C (τ i) = kτηi for
i = L,H, where k > 0 and η > 1.16 In order to make the comparisons it will be
useful to distinguish between two parameter regimes: p < p (“Regime I”), and
p > p (“Regime II”), where p ≡ (WN −WL) / (WH −WL).17 Regime I should
thus be thought of as a situation where society is relatively sceptic about the
possibility of large eﬃciency gains, whereas in Regime II society is relatively
optimistic about this possibility.
First, it is easy to see that SR dominates LF in Regime I, and vice versa
in Regime II. Second, it turns out that SR strictly dominates HE if and only if
η < ∆πH/∆WH . To see this, simply plug zN = 0, τ∗H = τHEH , and η (τ∗H) = η
into (7), which yields
EWHE = pC
¡
τHEH
¢ ∆WH
∆πH
µ
η − ∆πH
∆WH
¶
+EWSR.
It remains to compare HE and LF. From the above expression for EWHE we
see that EWHE > EWLF is equivalent to
pC
¡
τHEH
¢ ∆WH
∆πH
µ
η − ∆πH
∆WH
¶
> EWLF −EWSR = p∆WH + (1− p)∆WL,
(8)
the right-hand side of which is negative in Regime I and positive in Regime II.
First suppose we are in Regime I. Then, if η ≥ ∆πH/∆WH , we clearly have
EWHE > EWLF . In case η < ∆πH/∆WH there exists a level of k, call it bk,
such that EWHE > EWLF if and only if k > bk. Using (8), the fact that
C
¡
τHEH
¢
= k
−1
η−1
µ
∆πH
η
¶ η
η−1
,
16This stronger assumption will actually only be needed for the comparison of LF and
HE. The comparison of LF and SR will of course not depend on the cost function, and our
comparison of SR and HE below easily extends to any arbitrary elasticity η (τ i). Still, to
simplify the exposition, we make the stronger assumption already from the the outset of this
section.
17We will ignore the knife-edge case p = p.
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and carrying out some straightforward algebra, we obtain
bk ≡ µ∆πHη
¶η

p∆WH∆πH
³
η − ∆πH∆WH
´
p∆WH + (1− p)∆WL


η−1
.
Next suppose we are in Regime II. Then for η ≤ ∆πH/∆WH we always have
EWHE < EWLF . In case η > ∆πH/∆WH , we can, similarly to above, verify
that EWHE > EWLF if and only if k < bk.
Let us summarize the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Society ranks the three institutions LF, SR, and HE as follows:
• SR Â LF in Regime I, and LF Â SR in Regime II.
• HE Â SR if and only if η > ∆πH/∆WH .
• In Regime I, HE Â LF if and only if either (i) η ≥ ∆πH/∆WH or
(ii) η < ∆πH/∆WH and k > bk. In Regime II, LF Â HE if and only
if either (i) η ≤ ∆πH/∆WH or (ii) η > ∆πH/∆WH and k > bk.
By using Proposition 2 we can easily construct an overall ranking of the three
institutions. Figure 2 indicates for what parameter values we obtain particular
rankings; Panel A of the figure covers Regime I whereas Panel B covers Regime
II. Each panel depicts a diagram with k on the vertical and η on the horizontal
axis, and in each diagram the graphs of two functions are drawn: bk defined above
and k◦ ≡ ∆πH/η. The latter function gives us a threshold of k above which
this parameter must be for the insiders’ evidence-production decision under HE
to have an interior solution (i.e., for τHEH < 1).
Before we proceed to discuss the intuition for why we obtain the various
rankings in diﬀerent parts of the parameter space, let us make the observation
that the institution HE, which is the only one of the three institutions that
involves an eﬃciency defense, is indeed sometimes the best one. Hence, Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 tell us that an eﬃciency defense is sometimes desirable. If so,
however, the burden of proof should be placed fully on the insiders. The logic
behind this conclusion is that an institution where the burden of proof is placed
fully on the insiders will give them strong incentives for evidence production [cf.
(3) and the discussion following that equation]. Moreover, encouraging evidence
production will under certain circumstances be socially desirable.
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It is interesting to note that the argument that the burden of proof as to
eﬃciencies should rest on the insiders has been made before in the literature,
although the logic leading up to this conclusion has been quite diﬀerent from
the one here. For example, Fisher (1987, p. 36) writes: “The burden of proof
as to cost savings or other oﬀsetting eﬃciencies [...] should rest squarely on the
proponents of a merger, and here I would require a very high standard. Such
claims are easily made and, I think, often too easily believed.” It seems clear
that in making this statement Fisher is concerned about the truthfulness of
the insiders’ claims, and he thinks of placing the burden of proof on them as a
way of controlling this problem. A very similar point is made by Neven et al.
(1993, p. 206): “When the burden of proof is on the firm, the knowledge that
information that it conceals may count against it in the investigation provides
a powerful incentive in favour of revelation.” This argument goes back to the
so-called unraveling result in the disclosure literature, which is due to Grossman
(1981) and Milgrom (1981). The argument of the present paper is very diﬀerent
from–and should be thought of as complementary to–the unraveling result.
Indeed, updating of beliefs is not an issue here, because of our commitment
assumption. Our analysis instead suggests that placing the burden of proof on
the insiders may, besides encouraging information revelation, also serve another
important purpose, namely to provide them with strong incentives for socially
valuable evidence production (or information acquisition).18
Next, let us consider the condition HE Â SR if and only if η > ∆πH/∆WH ,
which we derived above and which plays a particularly important role in Panel
A of Figure 2. If there are positive externalities (i.e., if ∆WH > ∆πH), then this
condition says that we always have HE Â SR, since η > 1.19 This is intuitive,
18 It should be emphasized that this result concerns the burden of proof, i.e., the question
who is to prove the existence of eﬃciencies. Another interesting question concerns the optimal
standard of proof: how convincing should one should require a given piece of evidence to be
and what should be the minimal level of eﬃciency that must be proven? In our model we have
abstracted from these questions since, by assumption, a piece of information either reveals the
true state perfectly or not at all and our state space is binary. In a richer model, in which one or
both of those assumptions were relaxed, we would be able to derive also the optimal standard
of proof. If we did that, however, we would not generally expect the highest possible standard
to be optimal. For requiring a very high standard of proof would not necessarily create the
strongest possible incentives for evidence production. To see this, imagine an example were
there are more than two states and where the insiders can get their case through only by
finding evidence in favor of the very highest state. This might be so diﬃcult and costly to
do that investing in evidence production would not be as worthwhile as under a less stringent
standard-of-proof requirement.
19Notice that both Panel A and B are drawn for the case where there are negative exter-
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because if having a high-eﬃciency merger permitted instead of banned is worth
more to society than to the insiders then the merging firms will underinvest, so
society should encourage evidence production as much as it can. Recall from
Section 2 that having positive externalities means that a “high” post-merger
eﬃciency is so high that it would make consumer surplus increase. Hence, a
suﬃcient condition for HE to dominate SR (and, in Regime I, for HE to be the
best institution) is that, conditional on the event that the merger makes total
surplus increase, the eﬃciency gains are indeed so large that they are passed
on to consumers in the form of a lower price. The reason why we obtain this
result is not that we are using a welfare measure that only takes into account
changes in consumer surplus–our welfare measure does indeed consider total
surplus.20 Rather, the reason is that when “high” eﬃciencies are so high that
they induce a lower post-merger price, then the relationship between society’s
and the insiders’ interests is such that an eﬃciency defense will never give rise
to overinvestment in evidence production and, hence, investment in evidence
production should be fully encouraged.
If there are negative externalities, then HE will dominate SR only if the
cost elasticity is large enough. Why does the cost elasticity play such an im-
portant role here? One–perhaps rather mechanical–way of seeing this is by
noticing that for large elasticities the cost C (τH) is low relative to the amount
of information that one gets for these expenditures, τH ,21 which clearly makes
HE more attractive. Another way of understanding the role of the cost elastic-
ity, which is more in terms of economics, is to make the following observation:
in equilibrium, the cost elasticity equals the insiders’ “surplus from evidence
production”; that is, if we let B
¡
τHEH
¢
denote the insiders’ gross benefit from
having HE instead of SR conditional on knowing that e = eH ,22 then we can
nalities.
20Compare the following statement by Fisher (1987, p. 38), who clearly has a consumer
standard in mind: “...I would hesitate to use such eﬃciencies as an excuse for permitting a
merger if those eﬃciencies are unlikely to be passed on to consumers.”
21This is a property of the cost function C (τH) = kτηH . To see this, the reader may find
it helpful to sketch the graph of C (τH) as a function of τH for diﬀerent η’s. For η’s close
to unity the graph is almost linear whereas for larger η’s it is more curved, which makes it
possible to have relatively large τH ’s and at the same time low levels of C (τH).
22Formally, B
¡
τHEH
¢
≡ E
¡
πHE | e = eH
¢
−EπSR =
¡
τHEH ∆πH + πN
¢
−πN = τHEH ∆πH .
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write23
η =
B
¡
τHEH
¢
C
¡
τHEH
¢ . (9)
Hence, the larger is η, the more do the insiders’ benefits of having HE rather
than SR exceed their costs. As a result, for large enough η’s, HE will be socially
desirable also when there are negative externalities.
Now let us move our attention from Panel A to Panel B. Here, for HE to
be the best institution, it does not suﬃce that η > ∆πH/∆WH . As the figure
indicates, the requirement on η is stronger than that. Moreover, the other
parameter in the cost function, k, must not be too large. Apparently, there is
an asymmetry between a situation where society is sceptic about the possibility
of large eﬃciency gains (Regime I) and one where it is more optimistic (Regime
II): in the latter case HE (and, hence, an eﬃciency defense) is less likely to be
optimal. The basic reason for this asymmetry is that the insiders have a vested
interest in having the merger permitted, regardless of whether the eﬃciency
gains are small or large. Moreover, in Regime I this vested interest will be
easier to deal with for society than in Regime II. For, in Regime I, if not having
received a report it will be optimal for society to ban the merger, whereas in
Regime II it may in that case be optimal to permit the merger. This means
that in Regime I society will need to know about a high state, something it
can obtain information about with a relatively large likelihood by choosing the
institution HE. In Regime II, however, society would like to know about a low
state, which they never will get information about from the insiders.
The asymmetry between Regime I and II is neatly illustrated by considering
the limits p→ 0 and p→ 1. In the former case we still have the condition that
HE is best if and only if η > ∆πH∆WH , since that condition is independent of p. In
the latter case, however, LF is always the best institution.
Proposition 3 sums up the results.
Proposition 3. The institution that maximizes expected welfare is:
• In Regime I: SR if η < ∆πH∆WH and HE if η > ∆πH∆WH .
23To see this, note that, by definition, η = τHC
0
(τH) /C (τH). Moreover, from the first-
order condition that defines τHEH , we have τHEH C
0 ¡τHEH ¢ = B ¡τHEH ¢.
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• In Regime II: LF if η < ∆πH∆WH , or η > ∆πH∆WH and k > bk; and HE if
η > ∆πH∆WH and k < bk.
The bottom line message of Proposition 3 and the preceding analysis can be
stated as follows. By allowing for an eﬃciency defense society also encourages
costly evidence production (or information acquisition). Doing this may be
good or bad, depending on (i) how society’s and the insiders’ interests relate
to each other, (ii) how optimistic or pessimistic society is about the likelihood
that the merger will increase total surplus, and (iii) the technology for evidence
production (in particular the cost elasticity). An eﬃciency defense will indeed
be optimal under some circumstances–but, if so, the burden of proof should
be placed fully on the insiders. Moreover, an eﬃciency defense is more likely
to be optimal (from a total surplus point of view) when “high” eﬃciencies are
so high that they would give rise to a lower market price. This is because
then the insiders’ incentives to invest are such that society should encourage
evidence production as much as it can. Finally, there is an important asymmetry
between a situation where society is pessimistic and where it is optimistic about
the possibility that total surplus will increase due to the merger: an eﬃciency
defense is more likely to be harmful in the latter case.
5 Implications for Antitrust Policy
Our results are, of course, derived from a stylized model, and by studying our
particular set-up we have abstracted from many economic phenomena that are
important for the choice of a merger control institution but which are not cap-
tured here. Still, keeping these limitations in mind, it is useful to spell out
what our results imply for antitrust policy and the design of merger control
institutions.
Let us first be more specific about how we interpret the institutions LF and
SR of our model. We think of these as representing situations where society
(or an antitrust authority) has made a commitment not to take eﬃciency con-
siderations into account when deciding whether to permit the merger. Still,
these institutions are fully consistent with a merger control procedure in which
this decision is contingent on other circumstances, as long as information about
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these is publicly available. Thus, what we believe is special with eﬃciency gains
is that this is something that the insiders are likely to have (or be able to obtain)
private information about.
Another important question is how one should understand the insiders’ “in-
fluence activities.” One interpretation, which is the one we emphasize here, is
that this term refers to the insiders’ communication with an antitrust authority
in a formal regulatory hearing. Another and broader interpretation would be
that the influence activities also take place in informal (and perhaps secret)
interactions between the insiders and oﬃcials from the antitrust authority. As
long as we are willing to make the former interpretation, it seems reasonable
that the decision whether to allow for an eﬃciency defense does not have to be
made once and for all, but could be made contingent on information about a
particular merger case. If so, then we can make use of the results and insights
from the previous section in order to design a merger control procedure that
allows for an eﬃciency defense only when the circumstances are right.
Below we sketch such a procedure. This involves three steps, and it is con-
structed by means of simply inspecting Panel A and B of Figure 2: first it is
determined which panel is the relevant; then it is decided where in a partic-
ular panel we are likely to be. Our procedure presupposes that the region in
Panel B where HE is optimal is irrelevant in practice. This is always true if
society, whenever it is “optimistic” about having high eﬃciency gains, indeed
is suﬃciently optimistic (i.e., that p is large enough). If one believes that the
HE-region of Panel B is sometimes relevant, then the procedure below will be
a bit more complex.
Step 1. An antitrust authority that is faced with a proposed merger asks
itself the following. Given the information that we have access to at this stage
of the procedure (i.e., prior to any reports from the insiders about the size of
the eﬃciencies), do we think that overall welfare (i.e., total surplus gross of any
costs of evidence production) will rise thanks to the merger? If the answer to
this question is yes, then the antitrust authority simply permits the merger. If
the answer is no, then the antitrust authority proceeds to Step 2.
Step 2. The antitrust authority asks itself the following. Suppose, hypothet-
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ically, that we knew that the welfare gains due to the merger (gross of any costs
of evidence production) indeed would be positive. Then, conditional on that
information, do we think the eﬃciencies are so high that they would be passed
on to consumers (i.e., induce a lower post-merger price)? If the answer to this
question is yes, then the antitrust authority asks the insiders to provide it with
evidence about the size of the eﬃciencies. In case the insiders do come up with
convincing evidence that the eﬃciencies are large enough to raise welfare (i.e.,
total surplus gross of any costs of evidence production), then the antitrust au-
thority permits the merger; otherwise it does not. If the answer to the question
is no, then the antitrust authority proceeds to Step 3.
Step 3. The antitrust authority asks itself the following. Suppose, hypothet-
ically, that we knew that the welfare gains due to the merger (gross of any costs
of evidence production) indeed would be positive. Then, conditional on that
information, do we think that the insiders’ technology for evidence production
(or information gathering) is such that the cost elasticity is large relative to the
rise in market price due to the merger? If the answer to this question is yes, then
the antitrust authority asks the insiders to provide it with evidence about the
size of the eﬃciencies. In case the insiders do come up with convincing evidence
that the eﬃciencies are high enough to raise welfare (i.e., total surplus gross
of costs of evidence production), the antitrust authority permits the merger;
otherwise it does not. If the answer to the question is no, then the antitrust
authority blocks the merger without asking for evidence.
A couple of remarks about this three-step procedure are in order. First,
even though it may look as if the procedure does not consider other important
criteria than the possible existence of eﬃciency gains, these are indeed captured
by Step 1. For when the antitrust authority makes an assessment of the like-
lihood that total surplus will increase thanks to the merger, it eﬀectively also
appraises, for example, the merger’s impact on the degree of concentration in
the relevant market. Second, if the antitrust authority has to proceed to Step
3, then information about the cost elasticity will be needed. The magnitude of
this elasticity may of course be hard to observe in reality. Still, as our procedure
indicates, in several cases it will be possible to tell whether or not an eﬃciency
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defense is desirable without knowing the elasticity. Inevitably, though, some-
times knowledge about the cost elasticity will be needed. Hopefully, in those
cases the interpretation of the elasticity as the “surplus from evidence produc-
tion,” which we provided earlier [see (9)], will be helpful in making informed
guesses about its magnitude (or even, after all, estimate it using some observable
data).
6 Possible Extensions
In this concluding section we will briefly discuss some possible extensions and
variations of our model.
Evidence production vs. information gathering. In our model we have as-
sumed that the insiders know from the outset whether the eﬃciencies are high
or low but must invest resources in order to be able to communicate this in-
formation. An alternative assumption would be to say that the insiders at the
outset have just as little information about the eﬃciencies as society, but that
they can invest resources in order to find such (hard) information. Hence, the
insiders’ investment decision would then not be contingent on the true state.
We were using this model specification in an earlier version of the paper, and it
yields very similar results. In fact, most of the analysis is identical to the one
here–the only diﬀerence is the comparison between HE and LF (in particular,
the cut-oﬀ value bk is slightly diﬀerently defined), and even for that comparison
the qualitative results remain the same.
A consumer standard instead of a welfare standard. Throughout we have
assumed that society maximizes total surplus (net of any costs of evidence pro-
duction). How would the analysis change if we instead assumed a consumer
standard? To see this, first notice that if only consumer welfare counts, the
costs of evidence production will not enter the social welfare function. More-
over, Figure 1 tells us what the benefits for the consumers of permitting a merger
(i.e., ∆CS in the figure) are. We see that as long as there are negative exter-
nalities, society will always want to ban the merger (thus making SR optimal).
If there are positive externalities, then the incentive structure will be similar
to what we have under our welfare standard. Since evidence production is “for
free,” it is fairly easy to see that here SR is always inferior to HE. Moreover,
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a “mixed” z-institution will never be optimal. The optimal institution is thus
either HE or LF. One can show that there is a cut-oﬀ value of p such that below
this HE is optimal and above it LF is optimal.24
Other parties’ trying to influence the merger control procedure. We have
assumed that only the insiders can provide society with information and thereby
try to influence the decision whether to permit the merger. We think of this as
the most natural case, since the insiders should have better access to information
about any eﬃciencies than, for example, the other firms in the market (i.e.,
the outsiders). Still, one may wonder how the results would be aﬀected if
also the outsiders or the consumers could produce evidence. Again, Figure 1
helps us understand the incentives of these other groups. First suppose we
have positive externalities (we assume again, as in our main model, a welfare
standard). Then we see from the figure that the outsiders’ interests are always
opposed to society’s; hence, the outsiders would not be able to credibly transmit
any information. We also see that the consumers’ and society’s interests are
identical; thus, any information that the consumers had access to would also be
available to society, which would at least mitigate the informational asymmetries
between society and the insiders.
Second, suppose we have negative externalities. Then Figure 1 tells us that
the outsiders and the insiders have identical interests. This means that society
can receive information from two parties instead of only one, which could make
it less attractive to encourage maximal evidence production through HE. On
the other hand, there should also be a free-riding problem, and the convex cost
24We can write ECSSR = CSN , ECSLF = pCSH + (1− p)CSL, and ECSHE =
pτHEH ∆CSH+CSN (where the notation is self-explanatory). As in the total-welfare-standard
model, we can without excluding any optimal institution presume that zL ≤ zN ≤ zH . Hence,
analogously to (5), we can write
ECS = pτ∗H (zH − zN )∆CSH + (1− zN )ECSSR + zNECSLF .
An institution where (zH − zN ) ∈ (0, 1) cannot be optimal. To see this, suppose that we do
have (zH − zN ) ∈ (0, 1) in an optimal institution. Then we can write
ECS < pτHEH (1− zN )∆CSH + (1− zN )ECSSR + zNECSLF = (1− zN )ECSHE + zNECSLF ,
which contradicts the assumption that the institution is optimal. Hence, either HE or LF
is optimal (notice that this result holds without any particular assumptions about the cost
elasticity). Straightforward algebra shows that the cut-oﬀ value of p above which LF is best
is given by
p =
−∆CSL¡
1− τHEH
¢
∆CSH −∆CSL
.
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functions may make evidence production more worthwhile when it is spread out
on two parties. It is thus not clear whether this alternative model would make
an eﬃciency defense more or less desirable and whether, as before, the answer
would depend only on the magnitude of the cost elasticities.25 Finally, with
negative externalities the consumers will always be against the merger. Also
here is it rather diﬃcult to know how the results would change: there should
be diﬀerent eﬀects working in opposite directions. We leave this and the other
open questions to future research.
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0Figure 1: Gains and losses for different parties due to the merger.
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Figure 2: Panel A. Welfare comparison of institutions for Regime I.
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Figure 2: Panel B. Welfare comparison of institutions for Regime II.
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